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dc.contributor.authorRicker-Gilbert, J.
dc.contributor.authorMoussa, B.
dc.contributor.authorAbdoulaye, T.
dc.date.accessioned2025-01-20T09:31:31Z
dc.date.available2025-01-20T09:31:31Z
dc.date.issued2025-01
dc.identifier.citationRicker-Gilbert, J., Moussa, B. & Abdoulaye, T. (2025). Signaling quality in informal markets. Evidence from an experimental auction in the Sahel. Food Policy, 130: 102774, 1-14.
dc.identifier.issn0306-9192
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12478/8663
dc.description.abstractThis study estimates the extent to which rural consumers in sub-Saharan Africa value quality signals about their food. We tested this by implementing an incentive-compatible Becker-Degroot Marschak auction among consumers in Niger and Northern Nigeria to estimate their willingness to pay (WTP) for cowpea (blackeyed pea) that was stored and sold in an improved grain storage bag that signaled unobservable quality in the form of insecticide-free grain. The improved bag had two inner layers of high-density plastic that created an airtight seal around the grain stored in it. The seal killed insects through suffocation rather than insecticide. The bag also had a branded label from its manufacturer on its outer layer to help distinguish it from a generic single-layer, woven storage bag. We estimated the size of the price differential (premium) that the average consumer placed on unobservable grain quality, as measured through the WTP premium for grain sold in the improved bag with a label. We also estimated the effect that consumers’ previous awareness of the improved bag had on their valuation of observable and unobservable quality. Our results indicated that on average consumers in Niger were willing to pay a 10% premium for cowpea stored and sold in the improved storage bag compared to cowpea of the same observable quality that was sold in a generic woven bag. The same unobservable quality premium was 17% in Nigeria. The results from this study provide evidence that there may be a latent demand for quality proxied by food safety among limited resource people in sub-Saharan Africa and that improved products with branded labels can potentially provide a quality signal to the market.
dc.description.sponsorshipBill & Melinda Gates Foundation
dc.format.extent1-14
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectExperimentation
dc.subjectAuctions
dc.subjectStorage
dc.subjectBranding
dc.subjectLabelling
dc.subjectSub-Saharan Africa
dc.titleSignaling quality in informal markets. Evidence from an experimental auction in the Sahel
dc.typeJournal Article
cg.contributor.crpMaize
cg.contributor.crpRoots, Tubers and Bananas
cg.contributor.crpPolicies, Institutions and Markets
cg.contributor.affiliationPurdue University
cg.contributor.affiliationInstitut National de la Recherche Agronomique du Niger
cg.contributor.affiliationInternational Institute of Tropical Agriculture
cg.coverage.regionAfrica
cg.coverage.regionWest Africa
cg.coverage.countryNiger
cg.coverage.countryNigeria
cg.coverage.hubHeadquarters and Western Africa Hub
cg.researchthemeSocial Science and Agribusiness
cg.isijournalISI Journal
cg.authorship.typesCGIAR and developing country institute
cg.iitasubjectAgribusiness
cg.iitasubjectClimate Change
cg.iitasubjectFarming Systems
cg.iitasubjectFood Security
cg.journalFood Policy
cg.notesOpen Access Article
cg.accessibilitystatusOpen Access
cg.reviewstatusPeer Review
cg.usagerightslicenseCreative Commons Attribution 4.0 (CC BY 0.0)
cg.targetaudienceScientists
cg.identifier.doihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2024.102774
cg.iitaauthor.identifierTahirou Abdoulaye: 0000-0002-8072-1363
cg.futureupdate.requiredNo
cg.identifier.issue102774
cg.identifier.volume130


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